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EQUAL CITIZENSHIP: RACE AND ETHNICITY
RACE, LABOR, AND THE FAIR EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY PRINCIPLE
Seana Valentine Shiffrin*
The civil rights movement and the labor movement figure among
the most important political movements in the United States in the
twentieth century. Many liberals locate their political identity in large
part through their support of these struggles. Yet, strangely, race and
labor have an uncomfortable background presence in the most
important piece of liberal writing of the last century, John Rawls's A
Theory of Justice.1 While feminists have provoked lively and fruitful
discussion about the place of gender and family in A Theory of
Justice,2 the precarious presence of race and labor in Rawls's theory
has not generated the same attention.3
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, UCLA and Professor of Law, UCLA School of
Law. I am grateful to Benjamin Chan, Sharon Dolovich, Tal Grietzer, Barbara
Herman, Mdximo Langer, Gillian Lester, Lisa Lucas, Collin O'Neil, Tommie Shelby,
Steven Shiffrin, Jeremy Waldron, Lesley Wasser, and the participants in the Fordham
Law Review symposium for critical comments and assistance.
1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev.
ed. 1999). Where passages occur in both editions, I will abbreviate the citation as
"Rawls, A Theory of Justice," followed by the page number(s) of the first edition and
then the page number(s) of the revised edition, separating the editions by a slash.
Otherwise, I will make clear to which edition I am citing and where there are
differences between editions.
2. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 89-109 (1989);
Joshua Cohen, Okin on Justice, Gender, and Family, 22 Can. J. Phil. 263 (1992); Jane
English, Justice Between Generations, 31 Phil. Stud. 91 (1977); Linda R. Hirshman, Is
the Original Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1860 (1994); Eva
Feder Kittay, Human Dependency and Rawlsian Equality, in Feminists Rethink the
Self 219-66 (Diana Tietjens Meyers ed., 1997); S.A. Lloyd, Situating a Feminist
Criticism of John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1319 (1995);
Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good
Lives: Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 19
(1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, Rawls and Feminism, in The Cambridge Companion to
Rawls 488 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Toward Feminist
Perfectionism: A Radical Critique of Rawlsian Liberalism, 6 UCLA Women's L.J. 1
(1995). These criticisms provoked further, sympathetic reflections by Rawls about
gender equality and its role in justice as fairness. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement § 50 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001); see also id. at 11, 64-66, 117.
3. There are some discussions of race and Rawls, but mainly they focus on the
resources (or lack thereof) that Rawls's framework might bring to bear on problems
of race and not on the attention or lack of attention to these problems within Rawls's
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My primary aim in this Article is simply to dwell on the ambiguous
status of race and labor in A Theory of Justice-central in some
respects, but importantly peripheral in others. I will also speculate
about why a theoretical apparatus that has the resources to address
these issues omits to do so directly. Although race and labor cannot
be treated as a piece, I discuss them both because some of the
peculiarities of their treatment together become evident when
considering the part of the theory most pertinent to these topics-the
relatively under-scrutinized fair equality of opportunity principle.4 I
will not argue in depth for any particular changes to the theory,
although I will outline some ways the theory could be significantly
more responsive to these modalities by including explicit anti-
discrimination principles in the theory and by elevating the fair
equality of opportunity principle to a higher level of priority. I will
also discuss the complications such responsiveness might engender.
I. RACE
In some respects, the place of race in Rawls's theory is just what
one would expect. Although it is not explicit in his first description of
the original position,' it is clear from its spirit and from Rawls's later
remarks that race and ethnicity are features obscured from parties in
the original position.6 Indeed, expositors frequently cite the opacity of
own work or by the principles of justice. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman,
Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality 190-205 (1996); Larry L. Thomas,
Rawlsian Self-Respect and the Black Consciousness Movement, 8 Phil. F. 303 (1977-
78). But see Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls 164-65 (1989) (noting that race-and-
gender-based inequalities are "neglected" in A Theory of Justice); Hirshman, supra
note 2, at 1864-65, 1881 (noting that Rawls takes religious conflict to be liberalism's
main struggle and ignores both race and the contribution of race and gender to the
rise of religious fundamentalism). See also Simon Caney, Cosmopolitanism and the
Law of Peoples, 10 J. Pol. Phil. 95, 102 (2002) (noting in the context of Rawls's
international theory that Rawls's conception of a decent society allows for racial
discrimination).
4. But see Larry A. Alexander, Fair Equality of Opportunity: John Rawls' (Best)
Forgotten Principle, 11 Phil. Res. Archives 197 (1986); Richard J. Arneson, Against
Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity, 93 Phil. Stud. 77 (1999) [hereinafter Arneson,
Against Rawlsian Equality]; Richard J. Arneson, What Sort of Sexual Equality Should
Feminists Seek?, 9 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 21 (1998) [hereinafter Arneson, What
Sort]. While Alexander and Arneson are critical of the fair equality of opportunity
principle, I will take the opposite tack and argue that Rawls does not take it seriously
enough. See also the briefer discussions in Brian Barry, Theories of Justice 217-25
(1989); James S. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family passim & 154-
58 (1983) (arguing that equality of opportunity may require incursions into family
autonomy); Pogge, supra note 3, at 165-81; Robert P. Burns, Rawls and the Principles
of Welfare Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 184, 245-51 (1989) (criticizing the priority of equal
opportunity over the difference principle); Thomas W. Pogge, Three Problems with
Contractarian-Consequentialist Ways of Assessing Social Institutions, 12 Soc. Phil. &
Pol'y 241, 251-55 (1995).
5. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 24, at 137/118.
6. See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism 25 (1996) (explicitly placing race
behind the veil); see also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 16, at 99/85, § 25,
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parties' race as a representative feature of the "veil of ignorance,"
without even noting that it is only implicit that race is to be obscured.7
Nonetheless, it is strange how little is made of race and racism in
the theory. The two principles do not include any general anti-
discrimination principle for government, other basic social
institutions, or citizens.8 Strikingly, there is nothing explicit in the two
principles that resembles what many regard as the centerpiece of our
(somewhat) liberal Constitution-namely, the Equal Protection
Clause-or its statutory fellow travelers, the Civil Rights Acts. These
omissions are also troubling with respect to gender, sexual orientation,
at 149/129 (arguing that race is an arbitrary characteristic that would not be the basis
for any positive principle), § 77, at 506/443 (arguing that no race lacks the capacity for
moral personality which is the basis of equality).
7. See, e.g., English, supra note 2, at 91; see also Robert John Araujo, Critical
Race Theory: Contributions to and Problems for Race Relations, 32 Gonz. L. Rev.
537, 543 (1996-97); Roger Brownsword, An Interest in Human Dignity as the Basis for
Genomic Torts, 42 Washburn L.J. 413, 482 (2003) (stating that the Rawlsian veil in A
Theory of Justice excludes race and sex and finds racial discrimination unjust);
Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of
Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 Cornell L. Rev.
595, 669 (1999); Jesse Furman, Political Illiberalism: The Paradox of
Disfranchisement and the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice, 106 Yale L.J. 1197, 1202
(1997); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 Minn.
L. Rev. 1, 22 (2000) (reporting that the veil from A Theory of Justice excludes
knowledge of race, sex, age, abilities, beliefs, and commitments); Thomas E. Hill, Jr.,
Autonomy and Agency, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 847, 849 (1999); Erik Luna, Race,
Crime, and Institutional Design, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 183, 203 (2003)
(describing the veil as obscuring race, citing A Theory of Justice); Dawn C. Nunziato,
Justice Between Authors, 9 J. Intell. Prop. L. 219, 228 (2002) (stating that the Rawlsian
veil excludes race, citing A Theory of Justice); Yuracko, supra note 2, at 4 & n.6
(citing race and sex as features of the veil, though noting that sex-but not noticing
that race-is not among the original features of the veil).
8. The two principles of justice defended in A Theory of Justice are:
First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
Second Principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just
savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity.
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 46, at 302/266. The first clause of the
second principle is labeled the "difference principle," and the second clause is labeled
the "fair equality of opportunity principle." The first principle has lexical priority
over the fair equality of opportunity principle, which, in turn, has lexical priority over
the difference principle. The formulation of the two principles underwent some
evolution in subsequent writings by Rawls, but the changes are not significant for my
purposes. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 42-43
(reordering two clauses in the second principle, adding the phrase "members of
society" after "least-advantaged" in the difference principle, and altering the first
principle to provide for each person having the "same indefeasible claim to a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties").
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and disability. But, while much of my argument pertains to these
other omissions as well, I focus on race because it is especially
surprising that the principles of justice do not directly protect against
racial discrimination, given the evident concern John Rawls had about
our history of racial injustice. Rawls cites the wrongness of racial
discrimination as a prototypical "considered conviction" of justice.9
He repeatedly emphasizes the injustice of slavery. 1° Nonetheless, the
principles themselves do not specifically forbid racial discrimination
or arbitrary discrimination more generally.
To be sure, there are provisions in the two principles that do some
or even much of the work of an anti-discrimination principle. The
first principle guarantees the equal basic liberties.1 In A Theory of
Justice, Rawls identifies the basic liberties of citizens as "roughly
speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for
public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty
of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along
with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary
arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law."' 2 The
first principle's guarantee thus clearly rules out slavery as well as
apartheid. 3 It thereby also rules out forms of discrimination that have
9. See, e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 4, at 19/17 (noting
certainty in our convictions that racial discrimination is unjust), § 6, at 30-31/27-28
(criticizing utilitarianism for accommodating discriminatory preferences), § 25, at
149/129 (ruling out caste systems and other positive principles of discrimination as not
even moral conceptions).
10. See id. § 39, at 248/218 (criticizing slavery); see also Rawls, Political Liberalism,
supra note 6, at xxxi (taking opposition to slavery as a starting point to extend the
theory of justice to tackle inequities suffered by women), 151-52 n.16 (stressing the
importance that matters like the abolition of slavery be permanently enshrined so that
citizens express a firm commitment about their common status to one another), 233
n.18 (discussing the failures of the judiciary in interpreting the Reconstruction
Amendments), 249-51 (discussing the strategy of abolitionists in convincing the
public, as well as the civil rights movement); Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement, supra note 2, at 23-24 (contrasting the conception of people as fair and
equal with the conception of slaves, citing work on American slavery), 29 (citing
approvingly our antipathy to slavery as a fixed point that we will never relax); Thomas
Pogge, A Brief Sketch of Rawls's Life, in Development and Main Outlines of Rawls's
Theory of Justice 3-4 (Henry S. Richardson ed., 1999) (discussing Rawls's early
childhood awareness of issues of race). Rawls's interest in this history was marked by
a reputedly voracious appetite for books about Abraham Lincoln. Rawls, Justice as
Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 29 n.23, 147 n.18; Rawls, Political
Liberalism, supra note 6, at 45 n.48, 232-33 n.15 (all citing different books about
Lincoln); John Rawls, Times (London), Nov. 27, 2002, at 32 (noting Rawls's
admiration for Lincoln); Ben Rogers, John Rawls, Guardian, Nov. 27, 2002, at 24.
11. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 42-43; Rawls,
Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 291; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, §
11, at 60-61/53, § 46, at 302/265-66. The difference in formulation in these versions
does not affect my point.
12. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 11, at 61/53.
13. See id. § 25, at 149/129; Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note
2, at 21. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls is quite explicit that the parties would reject
racist principles as both unjust and irrational. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note
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a direct impact upon the equal distribution and protection of the basic
liberties. But, significantly, with the important exception of the fair
value of the political liberties, 4 Rawls argues that only the formal
equal basic liberties are guaranteed by the first principle. The worth
or value of those liberties may be affected by the distribution of other
primary goods whose distribution is regulated by the second
principle. 5 Not all forms of discrimination have an impact upon the
equal enjoyment of the formal basic liberties, even though they may
affect the worth of the basic liberties and are objectionable in other
respects. For example, racially-based employment discrimination,
housing discrimination, discrimination in the provision of public
amenities, discrimination in economic markets-loans and consumer
pricing practices generally-are all signal forms of racial
discrimination; but they do not necessarily interfere with the formal
equality of the basic liberties. To put it concretely, it is unclear what
specific provision of the two principles would directly condemn as
unjust the treatment of Rosa Parks and countless other African-
Americans who were told they had to sit at the back of the bus.
Perhaps anti-discrimination principles may be derived from the
guarantee of "the rights and liberties specified by the liberty and
integrity (physical and psychological) of the person" or "the rights and
liberties covered by the rule of law."' 6 Arbitrary treatment arguably
conflicts with the principles underlying the rule of law and with
respect for the integrity of the individual.
Were we in a society governed by the two principles, and drafting
its constitution or laws, I would certainly push this position. But it has
weaknesses as an interpretation of the text. For one thing, it is
certainly regrettable that the anti-discrimination character of these
principles is so submerged. For another, the examples meant to
illustrate the gist of these principles are scanty and do not offer much
encouragement for the idea that they provide the backbone of
citizens' protection against objectionable discrimination. If these
liberty guarantees are meant to function, in part, as principles
condemning racial discrimination, it is disappointing that this is not
made explicit, especially given Rawls's otherwise heightened
sensitivity to the way in which publicly articulated guarantees play a
role in expressing our mutual respect and in securing the social bases
1, § 25, at 149/129. Strangely, Rawls does not extend the thought to have the parties
consider principles protecting them against behavior that would arbitrarily treat race
as a relevant basis for decisions and distribution.
14. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 36, at 224-25/197.
15. Id. § 32, at 204/179.
16. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 44; see also
Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 291; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra
note 1, § 11, at 60-61/53.
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for self-respect. 7 Instead, these provisions, as Rawls exemplifies
them, seem intended to provide for citizens' physical security against
one another; to provide for a truth-seeking, open, public, codified, and
systematically applied institution of legal enforcement; and to protect
against overzealous methods of state enforcement, such as
psychological torture.1 8
Tommie Shelby draws attention to another section of the text about
the rule of law, in which Rawls identifies as injustices "the subtle
distortions of prejudice and bias [that] ... effectively discriminate
against certain groups in the judicial process." These instances of
discrimination represent the failure of judges and others in authority
"to apply the appropriate law or to interpret it correctly."19 This is
encouraging, but both ambiguous and rather tentative. Here, Rawls's
remarks concern only judicial enforcement of independently
formulated laws; however they are formulated, they must be
impartially administered. He suggests neither that the rule of law
requires positive legislation to take a particular cast, nor that it creates
a positive duty to create anti-discrimination legislation. Indeed, in
another section, Rawls characterizes formal justice as directing that
"in their administration laws and institutions should apply equally
(that is, in the same way) to those belonging to the classes defined by
them," but that this notion does not necessarily entail "substantive
justice."2 He entertains and does not decisively reject conceptions of
formal justice and the rule of law that are consistent with "the most
arbitrary forms of discrimination."21  Moreover, however broadly
understood, the guarantee of the rule of law only applies to the state
and its legal system.22 Importantly, it does not represent the idea that
other forms of discrimination in the provision of public amenities by
non-governmental actors are unjust in addition to being immoral.23
Many bus companies, lunch counters, and hotels, are, after all,
privately operated.
These considerations render it at best ambiguous whether anti-
discrimination principles are derivable from the first principle. Hence,
it would also be at best ambiguous whether anti-discrimination
17. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 12, at 65-75/57-65, § 82, at 544-
48/477-79.
18. See id. § 38, at 235-43/206-13, § 10, at 59/51.
19. See id. § 38, at 235/206-07; see also Tommie Shelby, Race and Social Justice:
Rawlsian Considerations, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1697, 1705 (2004).
20. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 10, at 58-59/51-52.
21. See id. § 10, at 59/51-52 (entertaining the notion of compliance with the rules
of formal justice nevertheless being consistent with other forms of injustice).
22. Id. § 38, at 235/207.
23. I deliberately bypass the issue of whether some forms of discrimination in
some private associations may be deeply immoral, but not unjust. I discuss the scope
and justification of rights of exclusion and the right of freedom of association in
greater depth in Seana Shiffrin, What's Really Wrong with Compelled Association?
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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principles could be adopted at the constitutional stage, for the
constitution's scope involves adopting those provisions and erecting
those social institutions that the principles of justice require. 4 Even if
they could be adopted at the constitutional stage, it seems regrettable
to leave open whether they must be, rather than making the
commitment to anti-discrimination norms explicitly part of the
foundations of the public culture of justice.
Furthermore, interpreting these provisions of the basic liberties to
include implicitly a general principle forbidding arbitrary
discrimination renders the placement of the fair equality of
opportunity principle peculiar. The hypothesized anti-discrimination
provisions of the first principle cannot encompass fair equality of
opportunity. If they did, it would then make no sense that there is an
independent fair equality of opportunity principle. Perhaps what is
entailed by the first principle guarantees something more like formal
equality of opportunity. But this is a strange intention to ascribe to
Rawls in A Theory of Justice, given that the discussion of fair equality
of opportunity explicitly pits it against the alternative of formal
equality without identifying formal equality as a part of the first
principle.2 1 If he meant formal equality of opportunity to be a
complement or an entailment of the first principle, it is peculiar that
he did not say SO. 26
As the prior argument suggests, the first principle is not to be read
singly, out of context. It is supplemented by the second principle, the
lexically prior part of which might be characterized as a robust anti-
discrimination principle. That part provides: "Social and economic
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are.., attached to offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity.21 7 Fair equality of opportunity requires that conditions
must be such that those with equal talent who make equal efforts have
the same chance of occupying positions of status and power.28
Although Rawls's articulated motivation for the principle is to
insulate the mechanisms of access to these positions from the
influence of class differentials, 9 the terms of the principle would also
rule out many of the most significant forms of discrimination. For
24. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 31, at 196-99/173-75.
25. Id. § 12, at 72-73/62-63.
26. In Justice as Fairness, however, Rawls does note that he regards some formal
principle of opportunity to be a constitutional essential. His brief discussion is
somewhat confusing. He does not indicate why this principle is not an explicit
component of the first principle, even though two sentences earlier he states that the
first principle "covers the constitutional essentials." Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement, supra note 2, at 47.
27. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 46, at 302/266; see also id, § 14, at
83/72.
28. Id. § 12, at 72-73/62-63.
29. Id. at 73/63.
2004] 1649
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
example, employment discrimination is obviously incompatible with
the principle of fair equality of opportunity. And, in most social
contexts, housing discrimination and other significant forms of
economic discrimination will also be incompatible with fair equality of
opportunity. 0
But, deriving principles of anti-discrimination from the fair equality
of opportunity principle is an unsatisfying route of ensuring racial
equality and of marking the wrong of racial discrimination.3 For one
thing, it renders the status of many anti-discrimination norms
instrumental to the aim of ensuring that the labor market functions as
it should. This is strange mostly because anti-discrimination norms
seem to have a more intrinsic, primary place in our notions of justice
than this conception admits. In addition, if the employment sector
were well enough insulated and complemented by a thorough-going
egalitarian education and training system, other forms of economic
discrimination or discrimination in the provision of public amenities
might not compromise fair equality of opportunity. Thus, so long as
their effects did not violate the difference principle (the principle
requiring the basic institutions to be organized so that if there are
social and economic inequalities, they are to the greatest benefit of
those least advantaged by them), they might not be unjust as
measured by the two principles. Although a crucial reason that
discrimination is so offensive to our sense of justice has to do with the
distorting effect on individuals' career prospects, other opportunities,
and avenues of access to power, it is not the exhaustive, or perhaps
even the central, objection to racial discrimination.
Finding principles of anti-discrimination embedded within the
second principle raises additional troubles that connect to the second
topic of this Article: the underdeveloped articulation of the
importance of labor in Rawls's theory. As the theory is set out, the
first principle is lexically prior to the second principle; and the second
30. Perhaps these forms of discrimination are also incompatible with the first
principle's guarantee of the fair value of the political liberties. In what follows, for
ease of discussion, I will put aside the fair value of the political liberties and focus on
fair equality of opportunity, because the latter principle more closely resembles an
anti-discrimination principle than the former. But many reservations that I have
about generating anti-discrimination principles from the fair equality of opportunity
principle also hold for their relationship to the fair value of the political liberties.
31. Richard Arneson advances a different line of criticism-namely, that the
principle does not sufficiently promote sexual equality. As he points out, the fair
equality of opportunity principle would not provide grounds to criticize stereotyping
socialization practices that affect ambitions in gendered ways and, through them,
reproduced gender inequity. See Arneson, What Sort, supra note 4, at 25-27. The
same might also be said of racial socialization practices. While it is true that
socialization practices are not directly subject to criticism by the fair equality of
opportunity principle, it would be difficult to provide the sort of educational training
necessary to fulfill the principle's commands without thereby engaging in teaching
that also combatted the stereotypes that produce significant differentiation of
ambitions.
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principle is to give way if the two come into conflict. This renders
important aspects of an anti-discrimination regime secondary, in
theory, to the protection of other basic liberties. If a conflict does
arise, it may have practical ramifications as well. For example,
depending on the scope of the basic liberties and in particular the
scope of the right of free expression, laws against racial harassment in
the workplace may be difficult to defend.
One might suggest that the scope of the right to free expression
should be sensitive to the aim of ensuring equality and avoiding
discrimination. Rawls is explicit that the basic liberties should be
conceived in ways that are reasonable and sensitive to other
systematic aims.32 But his main example of this mutual adjustment
involves understanding the right of free expression in light of the
conditions necessary to satisfy a different basic liberty-the fair value
of the political liberties-that, as part of the first principle, enjoys the
same status as the right of expression.33
It is less clear, within the theoretical apparatus, how we should
understand the suggestion that the scope of the right of free
expression that does fall within the range of the basic liberties is to be
understood in light of our interest in equality of opportunity. Rawls
does endorse the idea that we may prohibit job advertisements that
would exclude applicants of a particular ethnicity, race, or gender; but
he seems to suggest that these restrictions on the content of this sort
of commercial speech do not bear on the basic liberties because this
sort of commercial speech falls outside the range of speech protected
by the first principle.34 While this categorization of employment
advertisements may represent a reasonable limit on the scope of the
basic liberties, it would be much more controversial and implausible
to claim that all workplace expression by employees falls outside the
scope of the basic liberty of freedom of speech. And if this is so, then
the problem of racial harassment in the workplace and more general
issues pertaining to hate speech will arise. If the scope of (some) of
the basic liberties is to be interpreted in light of the aims of the second
principle, a convoluted, and not obviously coherent, relationship
between this interpretative directive and the lexical priority principle
is suggested. For, if the interpretation of the scope of the basic
liberties is to be highly sensitive to the aims of fair equality of
opportunity, this may deprive the lexical priority of the first principle
over the principle of fair equality of opportunity of much purchase.
Admittedly, though, one might dispute whether the dilution of the
lexical priority principle would be regrettable, all things considered.
As I will discuss at greater length below, no sustained argument
32. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 104.
33. See id. at 148-49.
34. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 363-64.
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appears in Rawls's work for the priority of the first principle over the
principle of fair equality of opportunity. The main argument for the
lexical priority principle focuses on conflicts between the difference
principle and the first principle. Rawls appeals to the fact that past a
certain floor, parties in the original position would be more concerned
to secure guarantees of their ability to pursue their conception of the
good than to enjoy greater material wealth." Whether this argument
provides grounds for placing lexical priority on the first principle over
the fair equality of opportunity principle depends on how we
understand the purpose of the latter principle.
On this subject, too, Rawls is strangely circumspect. The fair
equality of opportunity principle might be understood as a principle of
economic efficiency in production: Production is most likely to be
most efficient if the system of allocation of jobs is sensitive only to
talent and willingness to work and insulated from the influence of
arbitrary factors. Understood in this way, the argument for the lexical
priority principle would be germane to establishing the priority of the
first principle over the entire second principle, not merely the
difference principle. But this interpretation of the fair equality of
opportunity principle has serious flaws, generally and in the specific
context we are considering. While this interpretation would provide
an argument for the priority of the first principle over the fair equality
of opportunity principle, it would do so at the cost of leaving
mysterious the priority of the fair equality of opportunity principle
over the difference principle. If the fair equality of opportunity
principle only represents a principle of efficiency, wouldn't it follow
from the difference principle, which seeks arrangements to the
maximal benefit of the least well-off? Even if the difference principle
did not imply the fair equality of opportunity principle, understood in
this way, why would a principle of efficient labor division have priority
over the difference principle from the perspective of parties in the
original position?
From the perspective of an interest in racial equality, this
interpretation would have two further defects. First, it would
represent an even more instrumental justification for anti-
discrimination norms, one driven merely by an interest in efficiency
and not from sensitivity to the inherent unfairness and indignity of
racial discrimination. Second, it would be peculiar, then, to suggest, in
light of the grounds for the priority principle, that although the first
principle has priority over the second principle, it should be
interpreted so as to be sensitive to the aims of the second principle.
Why would it be attractive to delineate a narrower scope to the right
of free expression in order to serve the interests of economic
efficiency?
35. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 82, at 541-48/474-80.
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This interpretation of the fair equality of opportunity principle is
thus unpromising and, in fact, explicitly contradicted by Rawls.36 As I
will discuss in greater depth below, the attractions of the fair equality
of opportunity principle range beyond their contribution to economic
efficiency. Briefly, given the central moral interests of the parties, it
makes perfect sense that they would act to insulate access to
employment and positions of power from the influence of morally
arbitrary factors, such as race, gender, and class position. Access to
employment and positions of power would be of interest to them not
only because such positions are conduits to other primary goods, such
as wealth, but also because one's work and one's ability to influence
public affairs often represent important, and more intimate and direct,
avenues for the exercise of one's capacities and for other modes of the
pursuit of one's conception of the good.37  Furthermore, the
opportunity to make effective contributions to the scheme of social
cooperation, commensurate with one's skills and abilities, in
conjunction with other citizens, is also relevant to the realization of
one's capacity for a sense of justice. By acting in a cooperative way
and contributing to the scheme of social cooperation effectively, one
acts as a participating member of the cooperative scheme of social
justice.
In addition, the primary good of self-respect may be implicated here
as well. It may matter to ensuring conditions of self-respect that
individuals are guaranteed that they will be treated as individuals in
relevant ways and that they will be insulated from the operation of
ignominious bias. Thus, each individual in the original position may
have a direct, individual interest in how access to these positions is
regulated and not just a more general interest in ensuring that the
system of labor division tends toward the most productive system of
wealth generation imaginable.
But, if fair equality of opportunity is interpreted this way, then the
argument for the priority principle does not speak to this aspect of the
priority; it only directly speaks to the priority of the first principle over
the difference principle. If the fair equality of opportunity principle
appeals to interests of the parties other than their interests in
monetary wealth, then it is unclear why they would opt for a strict
priority of the first principle over the second. Their interests in fair
and equal access to work and in not suffering discrimination in such
an important area of life might rate competitively with their interests
in the other basic liberties. This is why I remarked at the beginning of
36. Id. § 14, at 84/73. In Justice as Fairness, a footnote indicates that Rawls does
not regard the fair equality of opportunity principle to be entailed by the difference
principle, but that he is also uncertain about how to respond to some critics'
suggestions that the lexical priority of the former over the latter should be relaxed.
See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 163 n.44.
37. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 14, at 83-90/73-78.
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the discussion of the fair equality of opportunity principle that the
interpretative strategy's implicit dilution of the lexical priority
principle might not represent such a terrible result. There may not be
a deep rationale for this aspect of the lexical priority principle.
But this interpretation points to some difficulties for the theory.
First, although perhaps appropriately, the loosening of the lexical
priority principle complicates the already difficult problem of sorting
out how the basic liberties protected by the first principle are to be
defined and situated with respect to one another.38 Second, if some of
the motivation for the fair equality of opportunity principle comes
from an interest in being treated as an equal, then the question again
arises: Why is this interest represented in such a piecemeal way?
Why wouldn't the parties in the original position select a more direct,
thoroughgoing, general protection against discrimination and place
this principle at the highest level of priority?
As I hope these interpretative arguments show, while the two
principles would put into place some important components of an
anti-discrimination regime, some of which are substantially further-
ranging than our current legal and social practices, the impression of
the absence of an anti-discrimination principle cannot be entirely
dispelled by a more creative reading of the two principles. Perhaps,
though, the absence of much attention to the problem of racial
discrimination can be explained. It may be that the problem is not
one that parties in the original position attend to because the problem
is incompatible with the assumptions of a well-ordered society.
The problem of race, for Rawls, may be a problem that arises in
non-ideal theory, not ideal theory. This seems to be the gist of his
brief discussion in Justice as Fairness.9 This is an appealing thought
that has some plausibility. Certainly, many of the pressing issues
regarding race, such as reparations and affirmative action, are
intimately connected to redress for and reconstruction in the face of
public failures and wrongs toward people of color. Some of the salient
political and philosophical problems surrounding race are legitimately
not well handled by a theoretical apparatus meant to be universal and
ahistorical. For example, properly addressing specific issues about
reparations and affirmative action requires sensitivity to
contemporary circumstances and historical facts. This requires access
to information that is unavailable behind the veil at the stage at which
the theory of justice is articulated.
Perhaps Rawls had these sorts of issues in mind, for he
acknowledges the absence of much discussion of race in Political
Liberalism," remarking that his intention is to focus on classical
38. See H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 534
(1973), reprinted in Reading Rawls 230, 239-44 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975).
39. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 64-66.
40. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at xxx-xxxi.
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problems of political theory and the grounds of the basic liberties. He
may have also believed that such public failures would dissipate were
the two principles, as they stand, implemented. If the two principles
were implemented, the significance of class distinctions as we know
them would alter dramatically. Even if class distinctions remained,
the absolute level of social stratification would recede. The effects of
class on other goods, like education and political influence, would
decline or disappear because of the structural forms of insulation
against class influence that the two principles would install. This
might both reduce the impact that racism could have, since many of its
devastating effects have been associated with the linkage between
class and race. It might also undercut the impetus to engage in racism,
as some of the origins of racial discrimination may lie in efforts to
achieve or reinforce class hierarchy.4'
While these motivations may explain the omission of an in-depth
discussion of race by Rawls, I do not think they fully justify the
omission of explicit anti-discrimination principles. While theoretical
work at this level of abstraction cannot tackle certain sorts of
contemporary problems, the unsuitability of the veil to handle
problems of redress or historically and culturally located features of a
society does not seem to justify fully the relegation of all issues
surrounding discrimination to non-ideal theory (or to locations further
down the four-stage sequence). As I partially suggested above, the
negative impact of racism, while severely exacerbated by its
connection to class inequality, is not -exhausted by its material
ramifications. So, too, it seems overly sanguine to posit that the sole
root of racial discrimination lies in material, class motivations and not
also in other impulses to power and domination or from fear of the
Other. The structural advances of a well-ordered society might
reduce racism and its effects. It seems implausible to say that they
would render these problems or the hazard of these problems
unknown in a well-ordered society. Racial distinctions and the
creation and treatment of subordinate classes of people have been
enduring, if not classical, problems of democratic theory.
It thus seems strange to classify, implicitly, anti-discrimination
principles along with principles of redress. Anti-discrimination
principles seem more analogous to the other, already-acknowledged
basic liberties: They demarcate a standard of treatment that is
forward-looking and that aims to regulate a latent or explicit hazard,
41. Rawls's implicit treatment of race may parallel his treatment of envy, with
respect to which Rawls takes it to be a product of unjust distributive relations. Rawls
begins by assuming that envy is not a motivation of parties in the original position and
is not among the motivations operating in a well-ordered society. He builds the
theory around the assumption that envy is not a prevalent motivation, and then
doubles back to ensure that the class structure and distributive apparatus are not such
as to generate envy. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 25, at 143/124, §
80, at 530-34/464-68, § 81, at 534-41/468-74.
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by establishing terms on which equal citizens demonstrate equal
respect for one another.
Still, one might argue that in a well-ordered society, the advances
would include not only structural effects, but attitudinal ones as well.
Its members would be well-motivated and compliant. These attitudes
would be inconsistent with actions or attitudes that evinced or
supported racial discrimination. While there is something to this idea,
it is difficult to develop consistently with other aspects of Rawls's
theory or at least with Rawls's theory as he understands it.
The thought cannot simply be that members of a well-ordered
society accept the principles of justice and are compliant with them;
for, as I have pointed out, the principles of justice on their face only
rule out some forms of discrimination, not discrimination generally.
One might make the further suggestion that the members of a well-
ordered society not only accept the two principles, but they also
accept the grounds for them. If they accept the justificatory
apparatus, then they accept that citizens are equal from a moral point
of view and that features like race are morally arbitrary. If they
accept this view, they would not treat race as relevant when it is
irrelevant and would not engage in racial discrimination. Parties in
the original position would know this, and so they would have no
positive motivation for codifying anti-discrimination principles.
There are two primary difficulties with this suggestion. First, it is
unclear how to confine its reach. If members of the well-ordered
society accept not only the principles of justice, but also their
underlying justifications," and if this acceptance affects their personal
conduct, then one runs into a version of the sort of challenge raised by
G.A. Cohen about the conditions of application of the difference
principle. 3 If members of the society accept that talent is arbitrary
from a moral point of view, it is unclear why they would use their
possession of talent (or others' possession of talent) as a reason for
action: It is unclear why they would regard it as permissible to use
42. This is unclear in A Theory of Justice, but it is made clearer in Justice as
Fairness that the aim in a well-ordered society is "mutual recognition of the complete
justification of justice as fairness in its own terms." Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A
Restatement, supra note 2, at 121.
43. See G.A. Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich?
(2000); G.A. Cohen, Incentives, Inequality, and Community, in 13 Tanner Lectures on
Human Values 261 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1992); G.A. Cohen, The Pareto
Argument for Inequality, 12 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 160 (1995); G.A. Cohen, Where the
Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice, 26 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3 (1997). Cohen
does not frame his argument in terms of the justifications that citizens accept as valid,
but in terms of their being guided by the difference principle. The former formulation
seems sturdier, though, for it bypasses controversial, and distracting, questions about
whether the difference principle as such applies to citizens directly. For, even if it
does not, the question would still remain as to how citizens could accept that talents
are morally arbitrary, yet still act to use them as leverage in negotiating in a
competitive labor market.
1656 [Vol. 72
RACE, LABOR & OPPORTUNITY
their greater or unique talent as leverage for greater access to primary
goods. Many Rawlsians reject this reading of his theory, often
drawing a distinction between individuals' motivations qua citizens
and individuals' motivations in their daily lives, including their market
activities.' (For instance, an individual qua citizen may be committed
to religious neutrality and may not permissibly be motivated to try to
institute a state-sponsored religion, but that individual need not be
religiously neutral in her personal life and may be quite reasonably
committed to a particular form of worship or to rejecting religious
belief entirely.) But it is hard to see then why a similar move could
not be made for race. Race and talent are both arbitrary from a moral
point of view. If citizens in a well-ordered society may permissibly use
their talents to their personal or competitive advantage in their
individual interactions and in their market activities (albeit in markets
that are institutionally constrained by the second principle), why can't
they permissibly use race as a criterion for action in similar contexts?
Either Cohen's argument is correct, or we need a further argument to
see why or how race and talent will be handled differently by well-
motivated citizens.45 While I am more sympathetic to Cohen's
concerns than many other commentators are, I am critical of this
understanding of the well-ordered society as an interpretative
maneuver to explain Rawls's omission of race, given the position it
would place him in vis- -vis talent.
Second, the argument assumes a level of ideality that may be overly
high. Parties in the original position are aware, for example, of a
variety of risks and hazards associated with government power.46 A
government that was in full compliance with its own rules would not
behave abusively, but Rawls allows that parties in the original position
may be reasonably sensitive to the potential (and historical tendency)
of state power to turn abusive and of majorities to try to dominate;
44. Joshua Cohen, Taking People as They Are?, 30 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 363 (2001);
David Estlund, Debate, Liberalism, Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen's Critique of
Rawls, 6 J. Pol. Phil. 99 (1998); Andrew Williams, Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity,
27 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 225 (1998); S.A. Lloyd, Self-Interest, Citizen Virtue, and Justice
in a Iiberal Democracy: A Rawlsian Reply to G.A. Cohen (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
45. One might think that the idea that the products of one's labor are inherently
and specially one's own is stickier than discriminatory ideas are. So, we might have
reason to think it a more utopian conception to expect the full internalization of the
rejection of self-ownership in one's personal life than the full internalization of the
rejection of racism. While this suggestion has initial intuitive resonance, its optimism
seems hard to square with the United States' own experience of entrenched racism
and the persistence of the legacy of slavery despite our official, public rejection of that
historical tradition. Perhaps, though, the issues connected to talents are more
complicated because they also connect to one's interest in choice of occupation. The
connection between labor and one's conception of the good that I discuss infra may
complicate the assessment of the ways and degrees in which talent is arbitrary for a
Rawlsian and hence the way that a well-motivated citizen would behave.
46. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 34-36.
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they will adopt constraints on state power that reflect this concern
with this hazard, even if a more utopian state would not need such
checks.47  They are also sensitive to and concerned about the
possibility of dominant religious groups trying to dictate the terms of
conscience to others.4" So why wouldn't parties in the original
position know of and be cautious about the tendencies of individuals
and social groups to identify some groups as Other and to develop
systems of hierarchy, oppression, and discrimination around these
identifications? Isn't it likely that parties in the original position
would be concerned about the risk of facing discrimination and the
attendant negative consequences to their self-respect, as well as to
their social and economic position? Wouldn't they therefore be
motivated to adopt thoroughgoing, highly ranked principles barring
racial (and other forms) of discrimination, even if only to make
explicit what adherence to justice requires of well-motivated citizens?
Perhaps Rawls's thought is that contingencies associated with race
are not essential by-products of social cooperative activity in the way
that class position and the differentials associated with talent are. In
Justice as Fairness, Rawls identifies three contingencies-those of
class position in childhood, native talent, and good or bad fortune,
such as with one's health and in one's placement in economic cycles.
These are the basic forces that affect individuals' life prospects and to
which a theory of justice must be responsive and deal with fairly.49 To
this, he implicitly adds the influence of state power gone awry. What
these all may have in common is that they are integral aspects,
components, or by-products of cooperative activity (or potential
weaknesses thereof); and so they represent central problems for an
ideal theory of fair cooperation to address. Perhaps his implicit
position is that either racism is derivative of injustice associated with
one of the social forces the theory already handles, such as class and
political power; or that it is a contingent, historical, evil phenomenon
that is not essentially connected to the problems that a theory of
justice must necessarily tackle. Hence, it would not be explicitly dealt
with in the theory, although the second principle's general provisions
about acceptable conditions on social inequality would apply.
This idea has more plausibility with respect to race than (at least)
those aspects of gender discrimination and inequality that are
connected to reproduction and the cooperative social activity of
creating and providing for future generations. Nonetheless, I am not
sure it has sufficient plausibility with respect to race. Even if racism is
not an essential hazard of cooperative life, it may be such a persistent
47. See, e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, §§ 36-37, at 221-34/194-206,
§ 53, at 354/311-12, § 54, at 356-62/313-18, § 36, at 226/199.
48. Id. § 33, at 207/181.
49. Id. § 8, at 40/36, § 10, at 55-57/47-50.
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hazard of social life that parties would regard protection from it as
one of the important functions of cooperative activity.
Furthermore, it is arguable that racism is a hazardous by-product of
cooperative activity in much the way abuses of state power are.
Although many characterizations of cooperative activity emphasize
forms of economic and material cooperation, they do not provide the
full picture. Our cooperation also consists in and produces
interpersonal ties, as well as cultural interactions and networks. Our
mode of cooperation is relational, social, and intellectual, as well as
material. This is not lost on Rawls, although his acknowledgment of it
is often indirect. For instance, in describing the circumstances of
justice and the tensions that give rise to the need for principles that
can form the basis for an overlapping consensus, Rawls highlights the
tensions and dilemmas created by competing points of view.5" The
competing views he is concerned with are not merely theoretical
positions or positions crafted by solitary individuals, but are ones held
by and developed in groups through associations, membership in
which has central importance to individuals and to Rawls's conception
of a just society as a union of social unions. 1 My point is not that
racism is a corrupt by-product of the clash of competing intellectual
ideas about the good life-a way to diminish the need to engage with
a challenging alternative by diminishing the humanity of those who
organize themselves differently or disagree with one's central views.
No doubt cultural clash is a factor that propels some forms of racial
and ethnic divide. But the point I want to make is not nearly so
specific as this one about intellectual avoidance or bad faith. Rather,
it is that motives of domination and identity-definition through
exclusion may be corrupt by-products of our sociality, and our
practices of social partiality and of constructing social identities, which
are in turn aspects of our social cooperation. Racism may be one
especially virulent form these motives may take. They are not
inevitable or uncontrollable by-products-or at least no more than
corrupt uses of power by state officials. But they do seem to be
natural hazards to which parties with knowledge of sociology might
well be anxious to police and to protect themselves against.
Thus far, I have only argued that the omission of an explicit anti-
discrimination principle is significant. It cannot be easily argued that
it or its effects are already comprehensively accommodated by the
structure that the two principles would establish. This is not meant as
a criticism of the Rawlsian theoretical framework, however. It would
be a fairly straightforward matter to make the argument for the
adoption of such a principle from the original position. Arguably,
such a principle would be part of the first principle and enjoy its
50. Id. § 22, at 127/110.
51. Id. § 79, at 522-29/458-64.
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priority, for most of the same reasons given for the priority of the
basic liberties. Freedom from discrimination, as well as the public
guarantee of insulation from discrimination, are important aspects of
a framework that underwrites the social bases of self-respect. As
such, they should surmount the importance of further gains in
material resources.
Rawls suggests otherwise in his brief discussion in Justice as
Fairness.52 There he argues that inequitable treatment based on race
would be permissible if and only if it maximized the position of those
disadvantaged by such treatment. In other words, he subjects
discriminatory treatment to the analysis of the second principle, while
registering that it would almost surely fail such a test.53
It is hard to imagine much racially discriminatory treatment that
would operate to the benefit of its victims. Still, there may be some
hypothetical scenarios in which there is discriminatory treatment that
seems to satisfy the second principle, but yet where the treatment is
clearly unjust. Suppose a racist portion of the population would work
more effectively if they were permitted to provide their services on a
discriminatory basis; suppose further that the surplus of their
increased productivity were distributed (by others) to the victims of
discriminatory treatment. This might pass a difference principle test,
but it seems unthinkable to permit on that basis.
It is difficult to see why citizens would insist upon equal access to
the basic liberties as a marker of their equal status, even at the price of
fewer other primary goods, but would not insist on a more general and
explicit protection of their equal status by a prohibition on arbitrary
discriminatory treatment. Notably, prohibition-focused anti-
discrimination principles meet the criteria for qualifying as a
constitutional essential.54  To wit: Prohibitions on arbitrary
discrimination do not require information or infrastructure more
complicated than those necessary for the basic liberties; it is both
urgent to settle this guarantee of equal status and a point of relatively
simple consequence; and it would be readily ascertainable whether
such principles are enforced.
Accounting for the selection of such a principle within Rawls's
framework does not, I believe, pose any theoretical difficulty. What
seems of interest here is, first, why such a principle was not provided
for in the first place and why Rawls's critics have been reticent about
its absence. I do not have much further to say about Rawls's
omission, beyond my speculations about why he may have, I think
52. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 65-66.
53. These remarks, however, are not fully compatible with his claim elsewhere
that something like formal equality of opportunity would be a constitutional essential.
See id. at 47; see also supra note 26.
54. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 49; see infra text
accompanying notes 85-89 (discussion of constitutional essentials).
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mistakenly, thought the problems of racism were either already
handled by the theory or not within an ideal, ahistorical theory's
domain. As I remarked earlier, issues of race and racism were clearly
important, even central, to Rawls's motivations, as evidenced by his
frequent allusion to the wrongs of discrimination and the terrible
history of U.S. slavery." Perhaps rejecting discrimination was such an
evident and central motivation that codifying it explicitly seemed
unnecessary.56 I am honestly unsure about the explanation for
Rawls's relative silence on race, as well as the relative silence of the
commentators. In part, I suspect that the evident necessity and
obvious compatibility of anti-discrimination principles with the
Rawlsian framework made the principles less than salient to
commentators because, perhaps, they are seemingly less
philosophically interesting. In part, I suspect the avoidance also has to
do with the racial composition of the philosophical community and
perhaps with some sense of pessimism that philosophy can do much
more to eradicate or ameliorate our nation's sad and persistent
failures in this domain.
While the framework of justice as fairness is friendly to the explicit
inclusion of anti-discrimination principles within the theory, their
inclusion would raise some philosophical complications. Hammering
out the details of any chosen anti-discrimination principle and its
relation to the other specified principles raises some well-known
problems, even in ideal, non-retrospective theory. There are
difficulties of wording. Should the principle be one forbidding
"arbitrary discrimination" or guaranteeing "equal consideration" or
"equal treatment" or something else? Will it specify suspect
classifications or leave this to another step in the four-stage sequence?
One will have to decide whether their application forbids both de jure
and de facto discrimination. (I will touch on an aspect of that problem
when considering the fair equality of opportunity principle in greater
depth below.) Issues about the relationship between the basic
liberties and anti-discrimination norms will have to be settled. As
mentioned earlier, controversies may arise about how one is to apply
anti-discrimination principles and principles of freedom of speech to
the workplace. Rules forbidding discriminatory speech and other
rules against racial harassment may seem both to be required by anti-
discrimination guarantees and, possibly, to raise freedom-of-speech
concerns. As such examples also demonstrate, decisions must be
made about the scope of application of such commitments and
whether they apply to some non-governmental agents, such as market
actors. If so, the theory will then have to face the question of how far
to extend anti-discrimination commitments (to social associations? to
55. See supra note 10.
56. The arguments about subjecting it to maximin analysis, however, indicate at
least some ambivalence about its proper placement.
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private actors in all contexts?), whether all these commitments of
justice should be legally enforceable, and how to define the limits, if
any are recognized.
The inclusion of an explicit anti-discrimination principle in the two
principles would amplify the vagueness of the application of the first
principle. Furthermore, the resolution of these issues may well be
more contextual than is consistent with Rawls's ambitions of resisting
intuitionist approaches to problems of justice. 7 The emergence of
such further complexities may be regrettable, but does not seem like a
sufficient reason to subordinate anti-discrimination commitments
within the theory.
II. LABOR
Concerns about racial discrimination can, I believe, be fruitfully
incorporated into the framework of reasoning of justice as fairness,
although at some potential cost to the clarity and publicly ordered
nature of the principles. Their incorporation would also-as I have
suggested-begin to raise some other thorny issues about the
relationship, within the theory, between the protection of the basic
liberties and conditions of access to employment. As I mentioned
when discussing the fair equality of opportunity principle, Rawls's
theory is importantly ambiguous about the significance of fair equality
of opportunity. This, I believe, is one aspect of a more pervasive
ambiguity that the theory shows toward labor, its relation to the ideal
of the person, and the motivations of people in the original position.
Even more so than with race, labor is both central and peripheral in
Rawls's theory. It plays a prominent role in the following respects.
For Rawls, the problem that a theory of justice is meant to tackle is
how the benefits and burdens associated with social cooperation are
to be fairly distributed. Cooperation, at least in large part, seems to
involve social and economic activity that redounds to our mutual
benefit, where this is understood in terms of the production and
protection of social primary goods. In part, a theory of justice is
meant to tell us how to organize, writ large, a fair system of social
production. Our interest in and capacity for labor, coupled with our
competing demands on its product, generate the need for a theory of
justice and the context in which it is supposed to be evaluated.
One way to gauge labor's centrality is to take note of how different
a starting place this is than the libertarian's.59 For the libertarian,
whether to cooperate at all is a live question. We begin, theoretically,
57. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 7, at 34-49/30-36.
58. Id. § 10, at 54/47.
59. Samuel Freeman provides a fairly comprehensive treatment of the other
major substantive contrasts between the theories. Samuel Freeman, Illiberal
Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 105
(2001).
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with independent individuals and ask whether they should come
together and on what terms, if any. This question does not come up
for the liberal, or at least not for Rawls. Social organization and social
cooperation are givens. This is not just because the libertarian
hypothetical of independent isolated individuals rethinking their
union will never be realized. It is not a grudging concession to the
pragmatic realization that there is no longer a barren Western frontier
(even then largely imagined) to start over or to which to threaten
flight.
Rather, I believe what is implicit behind the liberal starting point of
social cooperation is the assumption that social cooperation is the
necessary context in which the capacity for individual autonomous
development and in which the two moral powers of the individual may
be developed and fully realized." Autonomous, morally capable
individuals of the kind liberal theory posits, and aspires to foster,
could not develop in individual isolation in the wilderness. Their
possibility depends on, among other things, systems of moral
education that require social cooperation.6" The sorts of complex
conceptions of the good that liberal theories' individuals aim at also
require a background of social cooperation-to make possible certain
sorts of lives whose possibility depends on the time and specialization
afforded by the division of labor and on the social and technological
advances that social cooperation brings about. Furthermore, many
conceptions of the good do not just depend on social cooperation as
an enabling condition, but are ones pursued in social settings and
associations. (Again, it is interesting that the conflicts Rawls identifies
as the central ones for a theory of justice to address are not between
individuals, as such, but between social movements and associations in
which people, together, in social groups, develop and articulate
conceptions of the good.) For the liberal, justice takes social
cooperation as its topic not primarily because the pressing problem is
to devise measures of security and assurance to encourage the
otherwise unpalatable or risky endeavor of social cooperation. Justice
begins with social cooperation because social cooperation makes
possible the sort of lives and persons capable of just interaction and
full autonomy, as well as those capable of the sort of conflicts that a
theory of justice is meant to solve.
Another sign of the centrality of labor and social cooperation, albeit
one that I believe reflects a puzzling and unnecessary misstep, is
Rawls's treatment of the permanently disabled. He regards them as
not among the primary subjects of the theory, but as representing a
60. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 77, at 505/443.
61. See, e.g., id. §§ 70-72, at 462-74/405-15 (describing moral education and
familial cooperation).
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"special case.''62  It appears as though, as parties in the original
position, we are to assume that we are regularly contributing members
to the system of social cooperation, by which it seems to be meant that
we are regularly contributing members to the workforce (where this is
later articulated to include work in the home).63 In this way, Rawls
attempts to evade some of the difficulties for the metric of social
primary goods that Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, Martha
Nussbaum, and others have drawn attention to by representing the
disabled as secondary to the core problem of justice among
cooperators. 64
While this articulation of the scope of the theory underscores my
sense that social cooperation is central to Rawls's liberal conception
of justice, its interpretation by Rawls and his critics reflects a rather
narrow notion of what social cooperation consists. If, as I have
argued, social cooperation should be understood broadly, to include
contributions to the intellectual, social, and emotional milieu and
participation in relationships that foster and support moral agency,
then it is not at all obvious that even the severely disabled do not
participate in the system of social cooperation. Even those disabled
people who are unable to participate in the system of economic
production (though most are able to do so) still make contributions to
the culture and to our social and emotional lives, in part through their
participation in social and personal relationships of care-giving and
care-receiving. Thus, I think it is unclear that the difficulties Rawls
faces in dealing with the disabled stem from the assumption of the
centrality of social cooperation, so much as they stem from the
interpretation of what counts as cooperation. Taking such a stance
may require articulating a criterion of adequate participation that is
more sensitive to capability and revising the metric of primary goods.
But what should prompt these adjustments in the theory seems truer
to the theory's underlying motivations and is preferable to the
unattractiveness of sidelining the disabled."
62. Id. § 77, at 509-10/446; see John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral
Theory, 77 J. Phil. 515, 546 (1980).
63. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 162-68.
64. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (2000); Eva Feder Kittay, Love's
Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency (1999); Martha C. Nussbaum,
Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 Feminist Econ. 33,
51-55 (2003); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner
Lectures on Human Values (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995).
65. These remarks only securely apply to the physically disabled and to most sorts
of mental disability. I also believe they may well apply to children. I am unclear as to
whether a minimal ability to understand and manifest a willingness to participate and
reciprocate is a necessary condition of being a social cooperator. Certainly, the
severely mentally disabled are unable to develop the moral powers and interests that
Rawls identifies as securing our mutual political equality. I do not know whether it
follows that Rawls's conception of political equality is flawed; whether the joint
project of social cooperation includes some parties who are not politically equal to
others; or whether these parties present issues of justice outside the core conception
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But while, whether objectionably or defensibly, social cooperation
and workforce participation are central in some respects in Rawls's
theory, the theory treats them in an ambivalent way. It is somewhat
puzzling that the capacity to contribute to the joint project of social
cooperation is not highlighted as an aspect of the individual's highest
order interests and moral powers.66 Nevertheless, it might be
contended that the capacity for a sense of justice includes this, for
one's responsibility as a just citizen is to act in ways consistent with
mutual reciprocity and so to contribute, where able, to the joint
project of social cooperation.
I find it more difficult to dispel my puzzlement at the un-argued for
placement of the fair equality of opportunity principle. In the prior
section, I argued that the justifications given for placing lexical
priority on the first principle over the second principle only directly
apply to the priority of the first principle over the difference principle.
Strangely, there are no sustained efforts in A Theory of Justice to
justify the placement of the opportunity principle in the schema.67
Specifically, what is missing is an argument that both makes sense of
the fair equality of opportunity principle as a distinct principle that
has priority over the difference principle and that also justifies its
being subordinate to the first principle. Schematically, the problem is
that the features of the opportunity principle that distinguish it from
and elevate it over the difference principle exert some pressure to
elevate the opportunity principle to the same level of lexical priority
as the basic liberties principle.
As discussed earlier, the fair equality of opportunity principle
cannot be merely a principle of efficiency that connects people to that
employment that makes best use of their talents and skills for the
purposes served by the difference principle. If that is all that it were,
then its presence would be both otiose, already provided for by the
difference principle, and contradictory, for it would be prior to itself.
The fair equality of opportunity principle is distinctive in two ways. It
operates as a targeted anti-discrimination principle that provides
protection that includes, but ranges further than, formal equality. It
both forbids de jure discrimination and also aims for conditions of de
facto equality of opportunity. Second, it picks out access to
employment and positions of power as distinctively important to
parties in the original position.
While Rawls's arguments for the priority of the basic liberties over
the difference principle have some power, it is not clear that they
work as well in situating the inferiority of the fair opportunity
of fair terms between cooperators.
66. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 77, at 505/443.
67. Some remarks relevant to the priority of fair equality of opportunity over the
difference principle appear in Section 46 of A Theory of Justice, but they are fairly
sketchy.
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principle. I have already argued that at least the formal equality of
opportunity principle should be elevated to the first principle as a
mutual manifestation of other regard and respect. 68 So let me focus
on the remainder of the fair equality of opportunity principle: its
commitment to the fair value of equal opportunity.69
As Rawls argues, past a certain minima of sustaining wealth, parties
would not regard increased levels of income and wealth as on a par
with a secure guarantee of the formal ability to select, develop,
evaluate, revise, and pursue their chosen conception of the good.
Such increases would not compare with the secure guarantees of the
basic liberties and so should not be possible bases for trade-offs.
Furthermore, the social bases of self-respect may be better secured if
these liberties are non-negotiable and publicly guaranteed at an equal
level where they are taken to signify the commitment to mutual
respect-whereas income and wealth cannot so easily underwrite the
social bases of self-respect.7" Inevitable (as well as some desirable)
fluctuations in wealth and income distribution make income and
wealth poor candidates for concrete symbols of our equal respect.
Furthermore, whatever guarantees we make about economic
distribution will be more difficult to verify because of the complexity
of economic factors, the risk involved in economic forecasting, and
because economic decisions play out over long periods of time. These
are the main arguments for the priority of the first principle over the
second.
But fair equality of opportunity should not be assimilated to income
and wealth for three reasons. First, whereas income and wealth are
typically, though not necessarily, mere means to the pursuit of a
conception of the good, employment more often has a more intimate
connection to people's conception of the good. While not everyone
pursues meaning through their work, just as not everyone makes use
of, or values, the basic liberties to pursue a conception of the good,
many do.71
Second, just as with the acknowledged basic liberties, the protection
68. Rawls's remark in Justice as Fairness that formal equality of opportunity
should be thought of as a constitutional essential is compatible with this idea, but he
does not state whether this constitutional essential would have the same priority as
the others, the basic liberties. See also supra note 26.
69. The following arguments, however, may also bolster the elevation of a focused
formal anti-discrimination principle, even if they do not succeed fully in their own
right to elevate a fair value version of that principle.
70. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 82, at 545-46/477-78, 542-43/475-76.
71. For recent extended discussions of the role of work in sustaining personal
welfare, social and civic status, community flourishing, and social equality, see
Cynthia Estlund, Working Together (2003); Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of
Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 523 (1997); Vicki Schultz,
Life's Work, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881, 1886 & passim (2000) (characterizing work as
"fundamental to our conception of the good life" and "constitutive of citizenship,
community, and even personal identity").
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of opportunities for a range of employment activities provides a rich
context for developing and pursuing a conception of the good, a
context that gives individuals' choices greater meaning, even if these
opportunities are not directly pursued. Unlike primary goods like
income and wealth, full-time employment necessarily occupies a large
portion of individuals' time and attention. Often, work has quite
substantive content. Various forms of employment are devoted to
certain ends that individuals may endorse or revile. Frequently, they
also involve sustained interactions with others within a variety of
contexts and structures; these relationships may also bear upon one's
conception of the good. It may reasonably be especially important to
individuals that their employment (and its structure) at least be
consistent with their conception of the good, if not a venue for its
pursuit. These arguments do not, I submit, make controversial
assumptions about the nature of the good for individuals; they do not,
for example, depend on any ideal that work is the primary or a
necessary locus for self-realization. They just depend on the weaker
idea that parties motivated to promote their conception of the good
may have natural and strong concerns about access to work, as well as
its content and conditions.
With respect to the argument that access to work may further
parties' conception of the good, Richard Arneson has objected that
"job satisfaction" and "meaningful work" may not consistently
surpass the importance of money and other primary goods to parties
given the range of possible conceptions of the good.72 This objection
is not unique to the goods associated with work and so does not
distinguish between the first principle and the fair equality of
opportunity principle. Once the veil is lifted, some parties may find
that they care more for money than for civil liberties or that they care
nothing for greater resources and would vastly prefer equality over
the gains provided by the difference principle. Furthermore, the
objection succeeds, I think, only if one believes that the parties are
trying to guess at what will best match their preconceived, fixed,
particular conception of the good. This implicit characterization of
the agenda of the parties is mistaken, I believe. The parties identify
goods the possession of which or the opportunity for which tend to
promote conceptions of the good. They aim to identify fair methods
of distribution that will protect and promote both the interests they
have connected to the specific conceptions of the good they may have,
but also that will protect and promote the development of their core
moral interests-ones that allow for the possibility of change,
deliberation, and reflection on one's circumstances. Even if a good is
not of interest to a particular person, as it turns out, it may be
reasonable to think that a protected opportunity to pursue that good
72. Arneson, Against Rawlsian Equality, supra note 4, at 98.
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will tend to promote the particular interests of the person and will also
ensure the party has relevant opportunities for the development,
change, and meaningful choice of the conceptions she does pursue.73
The Aristotelian principle would provide independent, further
support for distinguishing access to employment from income and
wealth-although in later works, this theme has been submerged,
possibly because Rawls perceived it as overly substantive and
contentious. As Rawls argues in A Theory of Justice, though,
opportunities for training and exercising one's capacities and abilities
are important elements of human flourishing and are connected to the
conditions that support self-respect.74 The tendency to prefer to train
and exercise one's capacities at a challenging level, while not "an
invariable pattern of choice," is "relatively strong and not easily
counterbalanced." 5  While, for some, depending on the skills and
curiosities in question, this interest may be realized in other contexts,
such as social associations, work is a significant arena in which it can
be pursued.
Third, parties would have an interest in fair conditions of access to
employment because employment is, typically though not
necessarily,76 a crucial and appropriate method by which able parties
participate in the joint project of social cooperation. Given the
centrality of social cooperation to the theory, the protected
opportunity to participate in social cooperation may serve as a source
of social status as an equal and as a central locus for exercising one's
73. The argument that I am making is not one for a right to or protected
opportunity for meaningful work as such, but rather to an elevated priority for fair
equality of opportunity to whatever positions a market structured to satisfy the
difference principle would provide. It is a related, but distinct question whether
efficiency considerations directed at realizing maximin outcomes ought to exercise
such a dominant role in structuring the employment market, or whether something is
to be said for also making the meaningfulness of work a relevant consideration in how
the difference principle is applied. Increasing job satisfaction and providing wider
access to the complexities afforded in work may be worth sacrificing some efficiency
when minima of income and wealth are surpassed. We may not be willing to relax the
aim to ensure we select the most adept worker with respect to some forms of
endeavor, such as brain surgery. But, for other social cooperative aims, there may be
room to entertain some efficiency losses to achieve greater access to interesting work
for a greater number of people:
While I very much care about what our product looks like, I love that so
many of us get to make the doughs and bake. Sometimes the person who is
making the doughs or baking isn't always the best person for the job. But I
am committed to, and love, the idea that we don't just say, "Oh, these
people get to do this because they are naturally good at it and these people
don't get to."
Shehanna, quoted in The Cheese Board Collective, The Cheese Board Collective
Works: Bread, Pastry, Cheese, Pizza 71 (2003). For an extended and somewhat
critical discussion of meaningful work, see Richard J. Arneson, Meaningful Work and
Market Socialism, 97 Ethics 517 (1987).
74. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 65, at 426/374-75.
75. Id. § 65, at 429/376-77.
76. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the disabled).
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moral powers in community with others similarly situated and
motivated.77 As Rawls remarks, "the collective activity of justice is
the preeminent form of human flourishing."78  Having fair
opportunities to contribute in ways appropriate to one's abilities may,
therefore be intimately connected to individuals' core moral powers
and interests.79
Furthermore, the workplace may represent an especially important
site for citizens to interact with one another and to develop the
relations that support the social bases for self-respect. As Cynthia
Estlund's work has recently explored, the workplace plays a
"constructive role in making possible [an] extraordinary convergence
of close and regular interaction and a relatively high degree of
demographic diversity.""° To be sure, voluntary associations also play
an important role in a Rawlsian society in providing arenas for social
congregation, as well as outlets for the exercise of skills and abilities.81
But, the workplace may be an especially important site for citizens to
meet, interact, and learn about one another because they bring
together people who otherwise might not meet and interact
repeatedly in their voluntary associations. In the workplace, one may
work closely with others who are not members of one's family or
neighborhood and who do not share one's religious affiliation, moral
values, or conceptions of the good. These interactions may be
especially significant for generating mutual knowledge and respect
and for providing secure foundations for resisting the forces of
misunderstanding and ignorance that may generate social discord and
disunity. Achieving these benefits, though, depends on fair means of
access to workplaces, including measures that resist direct and indirect
social forces that would segregate and exclude.
Fair equality of opportunity, then, may serve as more than just a
protected means of access to other social resources; it may also serve
as an important mode of self-expression, a marker of equal social
status, and a mechanism by which respectful social relations are
77. The centrality of social cooperation to the liberal society and thus to a key
component of social standing may provide reason to resist the suggestion made by
some that access to employment opportunities may be fungible for other goods that
contribute to a good life. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Is Work Special? Justice and
the Distribution of Employment, 84 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1127, 1132 (1990).
78. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 79, at 529/463.
79. Fair conditions of access to the labor market may also contribute to
individuals' sense of self-sufficiency and their independence. As Gillian Lester has
recently stressed in discussing fair methods of structuring family leave policy, access
to the public workplace and its resources may be especially important for women to
provide opportunities to avoid unhealthy forms of dependence on male partners and
to promote more equitable personal relationships. Gillian Lester, In Defense of Paid
Family Leave (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
80. Estlund, supra note 71, at 4 & passim.
81. See, e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1, § 37, at 234/206, § 50, at
328-29/289-90, § 67, at 441-42/388, § 71, at 467-73/409-13.
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supported. As Rawls himself argued in explaining why fair equality of
opportunity is not to be considered merely a principle of efficiency:
[I]f some places were not open on a basis fair to all, those kept out
would be right in feeling unjustly treated .... They would be
justified in their complaint not only because they were excluded
from certain external rewards of office (such as wealth and
privilege) but because they were debarred from experiencing the
realization of self which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise
of social duties. They would be deprived of one of the main forms
of human good.82
The considerations I have just rehearsed complicate any effort to
extend the justification for the placement of the difference principle
beneath the first principle so as to justify the similar placement of the
fair equality of opportunity principle. Do they further succeed in
showing that fair equality of opportunity should be treated on par
with the basic liberties? Like the basic liberties, employment
opportunities represent crucial opportunities to act in accordance with
one's conception of the good, to develop one's capacities, and to
exercise one's most basic interests. Without denigrating employment
and regarding it as intrinsically only a chore or a mere instrumental
means to other primary goods, it is hard to see ex ante why other basic
liberties would be of lexically greater importance than fair conditions
of access to employment commensurate with one's skills and interests.
Notably, with the exception of the fair value of the political
liberties, though, the lexical priority of the basic liberties only applies
to their formal guarantee, not their worth. This might suggest that
while formal equality of opportunity should be elevated to the first
principle, the fair equality of opportunity principle understandably has
a lesser status since it goes beyond the formal guarantee and ensures
that each person has a robust, substantively equal chance, relative to
his or her talents and ambitions.
Whether the formal versus substantive distinction exerts weight
here is a somewhat complex matter. On the one hand, like the
political liberties, there are special reasons why substantive equality is
more appropriate to guarantee here than with respect to the other
basic liberties. There are analogies to be drawn between fair equality
of opportunity and the fair value of the political liberties. Although
the distinction cannot bear all the weight it is sometimes asked to
support, there is some distinction to be drawn between basic liberties
that are realized outside of a competitive setting and those that are
not. As Rawls notes, the political liberties operate within a
competitive climate. To guarantee the equal formal political liberties,
82. Id. § 14, at 84/73. The phrase "(such as wealth and privilege)" appears only in
the first edition.
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one must guarantee the fair value of the political liberties.83 By
contrast, it is less plausible to think of the right to freedom from
arbitrary arrest and seizure as competitive: Its respect and realization
for one citizen does not depend directly upon whether and to what
extent it is realized for another. As I say, this distinction can be over-
stressed. Whether one is actually free from arbitrary arrest often
depends upon the climate within which one lives and how others are
in fact treated. The same holds for freedom of speech and conscience
and the like. But, the nature of the liberty is not itself to be
understood in terms of a competitive arena for its exercise, whereas
political contests necessarily are. So too, are efficient employment
markets. The opportunities in question are necessarily competitive
and so greater worth for some parties has a direct negative effect on
the worth of the opportunity for others.
Furthermore, fair equality of opportunity is immune to one of
Rawls's main arguments for distinguishing between the formal basic
liberties and their worth. Rawls argues with some plausibility that it is
reasonable not to guarantee the equal worth of the basic liberties
because what a liberty is worth to individuals depends upon their
choices and their conception of the good.' It is reasonable to expect
individuals to take responsibility for the worth of the liberties and to
adjust their plans in light of how they will affect the worth of their
liberties. Furthermore, one's choices and plans may have greater
meaning when ramifications are attached to them than they would if
the equal worth of the liberties was guaranteed no matter what one's
choices were, no matter what their costs.
Paying heed to the capacity for responsibility of agents and
protecting the meaningfulness of the exercise of the capacity for a
conception of the good may merit some distinction (though perhaps a
more tailored one) between many of the formal basic liberties and
their worth. But these considerations do not have much purchase
with respect to equality of opportunity. If the liberty in question were
freedom of occupational choice, it might. But here, the issue is in the
provision of an opportunity and its formal or its robust presence. The
nexus for considerations about responsibility, action and its
consequence would properly enter at the point at which the
opportunity is either pursued or squandered. But to guarantee fair
equality of opportunity as Rawls defines it is not to subsidize certain
conceptions of the good over others or to insulate people from the
83. Id. § 36, at 224/197.
84. Id. § 32, at 204/179; see also id. § 16, at 94/80-81. While Rawls's argument is
partly persuasive, it does not fully address objections that some variations in worth of
primary goods are unrelated to choice and responsibility and reflect the impact of
arbitrary differences that should not merit our respect. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Justice:
Means Versus Freedoms, 19 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 111 (1990).
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ramifications of the choices that flow from their conception of the
good.
There is another, more institutional consideration that may be at
work here. One reason why the equal opportunity principle may have
a lower priority than the basic liberties principle is that its realization,
like the realization of the difference principle, may involve
complicated institutions and social forces. Its realization may take
different forms in different times and social contexts. Furthermore, its
achievement may be extremely difficult to verify and assess at any
particular point in time. Moreover, its proper mode of application
and the conditions that would mark its achievement may be
controversial. Hence, it, like the difference principle, should not be
considered a constitutional essential, to use a later term of Rawls's,
and should be properly subject to legislative discretion in
implementation.85
For my purposes, I want to concede a number of the assumptions
behind the position outlined in the last paragraph: that interpretation
of the basic liberties principle is simpler and less contextual, requiring
less discretion and flexibility than is required by the interpretation of
the fair equality of opportunity principle; that the implementation of
the fair equality of opportunity principle is more difficult to verify
than the fair value of the political liberties; and that the degree of
necessary variation, discretion, and verifiability in the implementation
of a principle is relevant to whether that principle should be regarded
as a constitutional essential. I do not believe any of these assumptions
are obviously true and I have worries about each of them. What
strikes me as more contestable is the idea that whether something is a
constitutional essential or not is co-extensive with its place in the
system of lexical priority.
If one has in mind something like our constitution, Rawls's mapping
of lexical priority onto constitutional essentials in his later work both
does and does not make sense. The U.S. Constitution does, for us,
represent a set of non-negotiable commitments. This corresponds to
what would be at the top of a lexical priority. But, for the most part,
in our constitutional structure, we are also concerned, first, to ensure
that constitutional commitments are judicially enforceable and,
second, that the nature of these commitments is susceptible to
85. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 2, at 48-49. The
term "constitutional essential" does not appear in A Theory of Justice. The
significance of the concept began to emerge in The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus
[1987], in John Rawls, Collected Papers 421 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); The Domain
of the Political and Overlapping Consensus [1989], in John Rawls, Collected Papers
473 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 6, at 166, 243,
246. It becomes prominent in Justice as Fairness. See also the discussion in Frank I.
Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, in The Cambridge
Companion to Rawls 394 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
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interpretations that are both specific and remain constant over time.86
This concern that what is constitutional be implementable in a certain
sort of way also makes sense of the idea that the difference principle
and perhaps the fair equality of opportunity principle do not belong in
a constitution like ours, given our emphasis on judicial review.
But while both steps here make sense, they do not warrant the
conclusion that the list of non-negotiables is exhausted by those that
would fit our constitutional structure. We might recognize some
commitments as as important as others, but as better suited to a
different mode of implementation and enforcement, namely through
the legislative branch. On such a view, we would expect legislators to
treat the fair equality of opportunity principle as a priority on a par
with the other basic liberties. This parity could either be marked by
having both principles stated in the constitution, but with the fair
equality acknowledged as enforceable through a different branch of
government.87 This is the theory of the political question doctrine;
although, I am imagining a structure in which legislative
responsibilities to enforce provisions under the ultimate purview of
the legislature would be taken far more seriously than some of the
constitutional provisions under the political question umbrella have
been taken in the United States. In the alternative, the fair equality of
opportunity principle might not be placed in the constitution, but
might (within a different system of constitutional government) be
understood as operating at the same level of priority as the
86. The political question doctrine marks an exception to the general presumption
that constitutional provisions are judicially enforceable. See Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 3-13, at 365-85 (3d ed. 2000). As my colleague
Stephen Gardbaum has argued, it is not obvious that constitutional commitments
cannot be meaningfully upheld through a system that does not give the judiciary final
say but instead rests ultimate interpretative power in and expects interpretation and
compliance from the legislature. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model
of Constitutionalism, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 707 (2001). Other recent work on the role
and room for a legislative role in constitutional interpretation in some domains
appears in Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions
and Judicial Review, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1105 (2003) (discussing the limits and proper
justification for non-judicial but authoritative constitutional interpretation); Robert
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943
(2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 1 (2003) (advocating
legislative role in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment). Such alternatives are
certainly worth considering and influence my thinking about how to separate
constitutional essentials from the notion of lexical priority, but I will put them aside
for the course of this Article and retain the assumption that our constitutional
interpretative system will primarily rest ultimate interpretative authority in the
judiciary.
87. Compare William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn's analysis of the
relationship between Title VII and other statutes and Title VII and the Constitution
in Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215 (2001).
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constitution, whether or not its interpretation and implementation
were dedicated to another branch of government.
Is the idea of a set of equally important priorities, parceled to
different branches of government for ultimate interpretation,
coherent and feasible'? The difficulty, of course, would be in
determining the boundary lines that defined the ranges of the basic
liberties and the fair equality principle. Potential conflicts might arise
under some interpretations of these commitments and some person or
branch must issue a definitive interpretation. There are a number of
possible institutional arrangements here involving different
combinations of suggestion and deference with respect to the
interaction between the legislative and judiciary branches.88 One
attractive possibility is that when conflict arises, the judiciary could
determine what the scope of fair equality of opportunity is, with
respect to its relation to the other basic liberties, but regard as
unreviewable (or, alternatively, its interpretations as legislatively
rebuttable) how, within this scope, the fair equality of opportunity
principle is to be applied.
One consideration relevant to constitutional essentiality may be
relevant to lexical priority as well-namely, the consideration of
susceptibility to transparent implementation.89 One reason that Rawls
gives to justify the priority of the first principle over the difference
principle is that the former may serve as a more stable foundation for
the social bases of self-respect, in part, because its implementation is
more publicly visible and verifiable than the difference principle.
With respect to the first principle, justice can more readily and
uncontroversially be seen to be done than is true of the difference
principle because of the epistemic difficulties associated with
observing and understanding the operation of long-term, complex
economic factors and institutions. This transparency may be
important to underwrite stable social bases of self-respect.
These are important considerations, but I am not persuaded that
they represent sufficient grounds to subordinate the fair equality of
88. One might read the Vermont Supreme Court's decision about same-sex
couples as a recent example of an effort to share the power to interpret the (state)
constitution in ways that try to take advantage of the differential abilities of the
different branches and the greater flexibility of the legislative branch. The Vermont
court ruled that, constitutionally, same-sex couples had to enjoy the same substantive
rights as were available to different-sexed couples through marriage. But the court
left it to the legislature to determine how to implement its decision, whether to make
marriage open to same-sex couples, or whether to create a legally recognized
relationship that is the functional equivalent of marriage. The court identified a
constitutional principle and a specified range of application to guide legislative
decisions, but left it to the legislature to determine the mode of application. While I
believe it would have been perfectly proper for the Vermont Court to have just
directly desegregated marriage, it is an example of the sort of power-sharing that I
have in mind. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
89. See Michelman, supra note 85, at 394.
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opportunity principle to the basic liberties principle. In part, this is
because the vagueness of the basic liberties principle and its
complexities (what precisely does freedom of speech amount to?)
already pose challenges to the transparency and full verifiability of the
first principle. Furthermore, it is unclear that the conditions of
implementation of the fair value of the political liberties pose simpler
tasks of verification than fair equality of opportunity. On the positive
side, many aspects of fair equality of opportunity submit to rough and
ready forms of measurement-e.g., whether different school districts
receive equal funding for students can be fairly readily assessed.
Many measures of equal, contemporary access to education and jobs
are easier to provide than reliable long term economic forecasts and
counterfactuals. The difficulties of public verification do not seem as
deep as with fair equality of opportunity as with the difference
principle. While concerns about transparency exert force, I am not
sure that the relative losses in transparency here are significant
enough to justify the subordination of the fair equality of opportunity
principle.
As with affording concerns about race a more prominent place
within the theory, elevating fair equality of opportunity would
generate a variety of institutional and interpretational complexities to
the theory. But while untangling these knots may detract from the
simplicity and clear ordering of the theory, these desiderata again do
not seem like sufficient reasons to subordinate the importance of fair
conditions of access to labor opportunities. While facing the
chal;'-nges associated with race and labor may be burdensome, they
are worthwhile tasks, as liberals have known for some time.
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